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1 I ntr oduction
ONE OF THE STEREOTYPICAL FEATURES in in ﬂ e xib le b u s in e s s m a n a g e m e n t a n d
c o n s e r va t ive c o r p o r a t e c u lt u r e is t h e c h a r a c t e r is t ic t a r d in e s s in a d ju s t in g t h e ﬁ r m ’s a c t io n s
a c c o r d in g t o va r io u s c h a n g e s in t h e e c o n o m ic e n vir o n m e n t . In e c o n o m ic t e r m s , s wift n e s s
in a d ju s t in g a c t io n s is a n a b ilit y t o in ve s t in . N a m e ly, t h e a fo r e s a id in ﬂ e xib ilit y c a n b e
vie we d a s a b s t in e n c e fr o m s u c h a n in ve s t m e n t .
In t h is p a p e r , we a n a lys e s wift n e s s o r t a r d in e s s o f ﬁ r m s ’ a c t io n s in t h e c o n t e xt s o f
t h e ir r e p e a t e d , in t e r t e m p o r a l o lig o p o lis t ic in t e r a c t io n s .
W e s t a r t fr o m a s t a n d a r d d u o p o ly s u p e r g a m e wh e r e , b y d e fa u lt , if n e it h e r ﬁ r m in ve s t s
in s t r u c t u r a l e ﬀo r t , e a c h ﬁ r m c a n r e vie w it s a c t io n o n ly o n c e e ve r y p e r io d . H o we ve r ,
if a ﬁ r m in ve s t s in m a n a g e r ia l s e lf-im p r o vin g e ﬀo r t , it s in t e r n a l d e c is io n s c a n b e m a d e
a t a n e n h a n c e d fr e qu e n c y, wh ic h e n a b le s t h e ﬁ r m t o r e vie w it s a c t io n e ve r y h a lf p e r io d .
Th is in c r e a s e s t h e e ﬀe c t ive d is c o u n t fa c t o r p e r d e c is io n in t e r va l fr o m δ t o
√
δ, e n h a n c in g
c o llu s ive s u s t a in a b ilit y.
A m o r e in t e r e s t in g qu e s t io n h e r e is wh a t if o n ly o n e d u o p o lis t in ve s t s in fr e qu e n t
a c t io n r e vis io n wh ils t t h e o t h e r r e m a in s u n in ve s t e d . W e d is c o ve r t h a t t h is a s ym m e t r ic
g a m e a c c o m m o d a t e s c o llu s ive s u s t a in a b ilit y wh ic h is in b e t we e n t h e a fo r e m e n t io n e d t wo
s ym m e t r ic s u p e r g a m e s , t h a t is , m o r e s u s t a in a b le t h a n in t h e s lo w ( d e fa u lt ) s u p e r g a m e b u t
le s s s u s t a in a b le t h a n in t h e fa s t s u p e r g a m e . In t h is s e n s e , t h e in ve s t m e n t u n d e r t a ke n b y
o n e o f t h e d u o p o lis t s a c t s a s a c o m m o n g o o d b e t we e n t h e t wo ﬁ r m s . It is a ls o n o t e wo r t h y
1t h a t c o llu s ive s u s t a in a b ilit y is o p t im is e d wh e n t h e in ve s t e d ﬁ r m is t o c la im a lio n ’s s h a r e
in c o llu s ive e qu ilib r iu m s a le s a n d p r o ﬁ t s .
B y e xt e n s io n , wh e n t h e r e a r e m o r e ﬁ r m s in r e p e a t e d o lig o p o lis t ic in t e r a c t io n s , t h e
p r e s e n c e o f a s m a ll n u m b e r o f s wift “ n o n -c o n s e r va t ive ” o lig o p o lis t s c a n s u b s t a n t ia lly
e n h a n c e c o llu s ive s u s t a in a b ilit y in s p it e o f t h e r e s t o f t h e in d u s t r y c o n s is t in g o f s lo w
“ c o n s e r va t ive ” ﬁ r m s . In s u c h a c a s e , t h e n o n -c o n s e r va t ive ﬁ r m s s e r ve a s p o t e n t ia l qu ic k
p u n is h e r s t o g u a r d t h e t a c it ly c o llu s ive s c h e m e , wh ic h p r o vid e s c o llu s ive s e c u r it y t o t h e
wh o le in d u s t r y in r e t u r n fo r d is p r o p o r t io n a t e ly la r g e s h a r e s in c o llu s ive s a le s a n d s u p e r -
n o r m a l p r o ﬁ t s .
In m ic r o t h e o r y lit e r a t u r e , qu ic kn e s s a n d t a r d in e s s in s t r a t e g ic a c t io n s h a ve m o s t ly
b e e n a n a lys e d in t h e c o n t e xt s o f n o n -r e p e a t e d g a m e s . Th e we ll-kn o wn S t a c ke lb e r g m o d e l
is a s t a t ic fr a m e wo r k wh ic h n e ve r t h e le s s m o d e ls a d e la ye d a c t io n a n d it s c o n s e qu e n c e s .
E n d o g e n is a t io n o f s u c h d e la ys o we s t o t h e s e m in a l c o n t r ib u t io n b y Ga l-Or ( 1 9 8 3 ) , a n d
m o r e e xp lic it ly t o t h e e xt e n d e d g a m e m o d e lle d b y H a m ilt o n a n d S lu t s ky ( 1 9 9 0 ) .1 In t h is
s t r e a m o f lit e r a t u r e , a va r ie t y o f t h e o r e t ic a l e xp la n a t io n s h a ve b e e n a t t e m p t e d in r e g a r d
t o ﬁ r m s ’ in c e n t ive s t o m o ve a s yn c h r o n o u s ly, e s p e c ia lly a fo llo we r ’s in c e n t ive t o wa it . S o m e
s t u d ie s c o n s id e r c o s t s . A lb æk ( 1 9 9 0 ) t a ke s in t o a c c o u n t c o s t u n c e r t a in t y. R o b s o n ( 1 9 9 0 )
a n d Ma t s u m u r a ( 1 9 9 7 ) im p o s e c o s t s a s s o c ia t e d wit h a n e a r ly a c t io n . S o m e o t h e r s t a ke
in t o a c c o u n t t h e e ﬀe c t s o f in fo r m a t io n a l h e t e r o g e n e it y b e t we e n ﬁ r m s , a s in Ma ila t h ( 1 9 9 3 )
a n d N o r m a n n ( 1 9 9 7 ) . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , a fe w r e c e n t c o n t r ib u t io n s fo c u s o n d e m a n d
u n c e r t a in t y, wh ic h m a ke s a priori id e n t ic a l ﬁ r m s c h o o s e d iﬀe r e n t a c t io n t im in g s . In
S a d a n a n d a n d S a d a n a n d ( 1 9 9 6 ) a n d Ma g g i ( 1 9 9 6 ) , t h e t r a d e -o ﬀ b e t we e n c o m m it m e n t
a n d d e m a n d in fo r m a t io n g ive s r is e t o t h e e n d o g e n o u s le a d e r -fo llo we r r e la t io n . N a m e ly,
e a r lie r p r o d u c t io n c a n u t ilis e le s s in fo r m a t io n in e xc h a n g e fo r t h e s t r a t e g ic a d va n t a g e o f
c o m m it m e n t , wh e r e a s la t e r p r o d u c t io n d o e s t h e c o n ve r s e . S a lo n e r ( 1 9 8 7 ) a n d P a l ( 1 9 9 1 ;
1 9 9 6 ) c o n s t r u c t m o d e ls c o n s is t in g o f t wo fe a s ib le p r o d u c t io n p e r io d s , wh e r e a ﬁ r m c a n
e a r n t h e s t a t u s o f a S t a c ke lb e r g le a d e r b y c h o o s in g t o p r o d u c e in t h e fo r m e r p e r io d .2
In s p it e o f t h e ir in t e n d e d ly d yn a m ic fr a m e wo r k, m a n y o f t h e s e p r e c e d in g t h e o r e t ic a l
s t u d ie s c o n s id e r a s t a t ic m a r ke t t h a t o p e n s o n ly o n c e . A s we d is c o ve r , it t u r n s o u t
m o s t ly b e c a u s e o f t h is s t a t ic s t r u c t u r e t h a t a qu ic k a c t io n b e c o m e s u n e qu ivo c a lly a n d
1The extended game has two versions, one called the extended game with observable delay, the other
called the extended game with action commitment. The former is the formulation most relevant to our
purposes in this paper.
2The strategic purpose of advance production is not necessarily to earn Stackelberg leadership. Even
in the absence of the leader-follower relation, ﬁrms may still have a pre-emptive incentives for advance
production. Note that advance production cannot automatically preclude the possibility that the ﬁrm
may still choose not to sell all the quantity produced. In other words, advance production alone cannot
guarantee any quantity commitment.
2m o n o t o n ic a lly le s s a t t r a c t ive a n d t h u s le s s like ly t o b e e n d o g e n o u s ly o p t e d fo r a s it s c o s t s
g r o w d e a r e r , a r e s u lt wh ic h m ig h t a p p e a r a s if o b vio u s t o o u r s p o n t a n e o u s in t u it io n .
R e a lis m o f t h e s t a t ic fr a m e wo r k c a n a ls o b e lim it e d . Th e r e m a y n o t a lwa ys b e c o g e n t
r e a s o n t o b e lie ve t h a t t h e m a r ke t n e e d s t o wa it id ly u n t il t h e s e c o n d m o ve r m a ke s u p
it s m in d . Mo r e o ft e n t h a n n o t , t h e m a r ke t r e p e a t s o ve r m u lt ip le p e r io d s , wh e r e t wo
qu a lit a t ive d iﬀe r e n c e s fr o m t h e s t a t ic m a r ke t a r is e . Fir s t , t h e s wift n e s s o r t h e t a r d in e s s
o f a c t io n s s h o u ld b e m e a s u r e d b y t h e fr e qu e n c y o f a c t io n s r a t h e r t h a n t h e t im in g o f a
o n e -s h o t a c t io n . S e c o n d , t h e p r o s p e c t o f t a c it c o llu s io n a s a s u b g a m e p e r fe c t p a t h s h o u ld
a ls o b e t a ke n in t o c o n s id e r a t io n .
Th e r e m a in d e r o f t h e p a p e r is o r g a n is e d a s fo llo ws . In s e c t io n 2 we c o n d u c t a c o m p a r -
a t ive s t a t ic s e xe r c is e wit h r e s p e c t t o t h e fr e qu e n c y o f e a c h ﬁ r m ’s a c t io n r e vis io n in a
s im p le lin e a r B e r t r a n d d u o p o ly. In s e c t io n 3 we e xt e n d t h e g a m e b y a d d in g a p r e -p la y
s t a g e wh e r e e a c h ﬁ r m c a n e it h e r in ve s t in fr e qu e n t r e vis io n o r n o t . W e t h e n s o lve t h e
e xt e n d e d g a m e b a c kwa r d t o e s t a b lis h t h e e xis t e n c e o f c o llu s ive e qu ilib r ia wh e r e o n ly o n e
ﬁ r m in ve s t s . Th o s e r a n g e s o f t h e in it ia l in ve s t m e n t c o s t s a n d t h e d is c o u n t fa c t o r wh e r e
s u c h a s ym m e t r ic c o llu s ive e qu ilib r ia m a t e r ia lis e a r e id e n t iﬁ e d in s e c t io n 4 . Ge n e r a lit y o f
o u r ﬁ n d in g s is p r o b e d in s e c t io n 5 . In a la r g e c la s s o f d yn a m ic o lig o p o ly g a m e s in c lu d in g
o u r lin e a r B e r t r a n d e xa m p le , a ﬁ r m ’s u n ila t e r a l d e via t io n c a n b e e ﬀe c t ive ly d e t e r r e d b y
n o m o r e t h a n o n e p u n is h e r , im p lyin g t h a t a t m o s t t wo ﬁ r m s in ve s t in g in fr e qu e n t a c t io n
r e vis io n c a n s u ﬃ c e in o r d e r t o a t t a in u t m o s t c o llu s ive s u s t a in a b ilit y. Fin a lly we d is c u s s
e c o n o m ic im p lic a t io n s o f o u r a n a lys is in s e c t io n 6 t o c o n c lu d e t h e p a p e r .
2 Repeated linear B er tr and duopoly
2.1 T he stage game
B e r t r a n d d u o p o lis t s , la b e lle d 1 a n d 2 h e n c e fo r t h , fa c e a n o n -s t o c h a s t ic in ve r s e d e m a n d
Q[P] wh e r e P = m in {p1,p2} a n d t h e a g g r e g a t e qu a n t it y o f t r a n s a c t io n Q[P] is s u p p lie d
b y wh ic h e ve r ﬁ r m wh o c h a r g e s t h e lo we r p r ic e b e t we e n t h e t wo ﬁ r m s . If a n d o n ly if t h e
t wo ﬁ r m s s e t t h e s a m e p r ic e P = p1 = p2 , t h e a g g r e g a t e s u p p ly Q c a n b e s h a r e d b e t we e n
t h e m . Ma r g in a l p r o d u c t io n c o s t s a r e n il.
In t h e fo llo win g , we c o n s id e r a s u p e r g a m e wh e r e in t h e a fo r e s a id s t a g e g a m e r e c u r s
s t a t io n a r ily a lo n g c o n t in u o u s t im e t ∈ [0 ,∞) . L e t δ d e n o t e t h e d is c o u n t fa c t o r p e r u n it
p e r io d .
32.2 T he default super game
S u p p o s e ﬁ r s t t h a t e a c h ﬁ r m c a n r e vis e it s a c t io n , t h a t is t h e s a le s p r ic e , e ve r y in t e g e r p e r io d
t = 0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,···. In e ﬀe c t , t h is is e qu iva le n t t o a s im p le B e r t r a n d o lig o p o ly s u p e r g a m e
wit h d is c r e t e t im e t = 0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,··· wh e r e s ym m e t r ic c o llu s io n a t a n y p o s it ive p r ic e P =
p1 = p2 > 0 , q1 = q2 =
Q[P]
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It is e a s ily ve r iﬁ e d t h a t n o c o llu s io n , a t a n y p o s it ive p r ic e , m a y b e s u s t a in e d wit h s u b g a m e
















fo r e it h e r ﬁ r m , wh e r e we d e ﬁ n e t h e d is c o u n t r a t e r = −ln δ , t h a t is δ = e−r.
2.3 T he expedited super game










Th is is e qu iva le n t t o a d is c r e t e -t im e lin e a r B e r t r a n d o lig o p o ly s u p e r g a m e wit h h a lf-in t e g e r









,3 ,···. Th e o n ly d iﬀe r e n c e fr o m t h e p r e vio u s d e fa u lt s u p e r g a m e
is t h e t im e in t e r va l, wh ic h h a s n o w b e e n h a lve d . Th is t r a n s la t e s t o t h e d is c o u n t fa c t o r
b e in g
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Th e d is c o u n t e d c o llu s ive p r o ﬁ t s p e r ﬁ r m r e m a in u n c h a n g e d fr o m t h e p r e vio u s d e fa u lt
s u p e r g a m e .
2.4 T he asymmetr ic game
Fin a lly, if o n ly o n e o f t h e t wo ﬁ r m s c a n r e vis e it s a c t io n e ve r y h a lf p e r io d wh ils t t h e
o t h e r ﬁ r m c a n r e vis e it s a c t io n o n ly e ve r y fu ll p e r io d , t h e e xis t in g r e s u lt s e s t a b lis h e d in
p r e c e d in g lit e r a t u r e c a n n o lo n g e r d ir e c t ly a p p ly.
N o t e ﬁ r s t t h a t , if t h e s e t wo ﬁ r m s we r e t o s h a r e t h e ir c o llu s ive p r o ﬁ t s e ve n ly, t h e ﬁ r m
wit h s wift e r r e vis io n wo u ld h a ve h ig h e r in c e n t ive s t o d e via t e fr o m c o llu s io n . Th e in t u it io n
3Lambson (1987) shows that when the threat point entails zero discounted proﬁts (which Lambson
refers to as the “security level”), the so-called optimal punishment ` a la Abreu (1986, 1988), Abreu, Pearce
and Stacchetti (1986), and H¨ ackner (1996), yields the same critical discount factor as the trigger strategy
with static Nash reversion ` a la Friedman (1971).
4is s t r a ig h t fo r wa r d : t h e s wift e r ﬁ r m ’s d e via t io n wo u ld n o t b e p u n is h e d u n t il a fu ll p e r io d
la t e r , wh e r e a s t h e s lo we r ﬁ r m ’s d e via t io n c o u ld b e p u n is h e d o n ly a h a lf p e r io d la t e r .
In g e n e r a l, if t h e s wift e r ﬁ r m s u p p lie s qi a n d t h e s lo we r ﬁ r m qu , t h e ir in c e n t ive s a g a in s t




















( 2 .4 .2 )
wh e r e
qi + qu = Q[P]. ( 2 .4 .3 )
A n y qu a n t it y p r o ﬁ le {qi,qu} in a c c o r d a n c e wit h c o n s t r a in t s ( 2 .4 .1 ) t h r o u g h ( 2 .4 .3 ) c a n
b e s u s t a in e d wit h s u b g a m e p e r fe c t io n a s a c o llu s ive o u t c o m e . Th e d is c o u n t e d c o llu s ive




































Q[P]. ( 2 .4 .4 )





= 0 .3 8 1 9 6 6 ··· <
1
2
, t h is s o lu t io n im p lie s
t h a t c o llu s ive s u s t a in a b ilit y c a n b e e n h a n c e d e ve n wh e n o n ly o n e o f t h e d u o p o lis t s a c qu ir e s
s wift n e s s in r e vis in g it s a c t io n .
3 T he extended game
W e n o w e n vis io n a n e xt e n d e d g a m e a t t h e b e g in n in g o f wh ic h e a c h o f t h e t wo d u o p o lis t s
c h o o s e s wh e t h e r t o in ve s t in e n h a n c in g it s a c t io n fr e qu e n c y. A ﬁ r m wh o h a s m a d e t h e










,3 ,···, wh ils t a ﬁ r m wh o h a s m a d e n o in ve s t m e n t c a n r e vis e it s a c t io n o n ly
e ve r y p e r io d t = 0 ,1 ,2 ,3 ,···. Th e in it ia l in ve s t m e n t c o s t s k.
W h e n e ve r p r a c t ic a b le , ﬁ r m s vo lu n t a r ily e n d e a vo u r t o s u s t a in p r ic e c o llu s io n , fo r e s e e in g
wh ic h t h e y c h o o s e t h e ir in it ia l in ve s t m e n t . Fr o m o u r fo r e g o in g a n a lys is in s e c t io n 2 , t h e
fo llo win g s u b g a m e p e r fe c t e qu ilib r iu m r e s u lt s o b t a in , wh e r e P d e n o t e s t h e c o llu s ive p r ic e
a n d Q[P] t h e c o llu s ive a g g r e g a t e s u p p ly qu a n t it y.
53.1 H igh discount factor - weak time pr efer ences
In t h e r a n g e
1
2
≤ δ < 1 , t a c it c o llu s io n is s u s t a in a b le a ft e r a n y in it ia l in ve s t m e n t p r o ﬁ le .
Ga m e -t h e o r e t ic a lly s p e a kin g , N a s h e qu ilib r ia m a y d e p e n d u p o n t h e s h a r e s qi a n d qu
b e c a u s e , e s p e c ia lly fo r a ve r y h ig h δ , a va s t r a n g e o f s h a r e s {qi,qu} c a n b e s u s t a in e d a s
c o llu s ive p r o ﬁ le s . Ob vio u s ly, h o we ve r , t h e m o s t p r o ﬁ t -e ﬃ c ie n t e qu ilib r iu m is fo r n e it h e r
ﬁ r m t o in ve s t , wit h s u c h a n o ﬀ-e qu ilib r iu m p r o ﬁ le {qi,qu} t h a t d is c o u r a g e s b o t h ﬁ r m s
fr o m t h e in it ia l in ve s t m e n t , a c c o r d in g t o t h e fo llo win g d is c o u n t e d p r o ﬁ t m a t r ix.

























3.2 M edium discount factor - moder ate time pr efer ences








, t a c it c o llu s io n is s u s t a in a b le wh e n a t le a s t o n e o f t h e
d u o p o lis t s h a s in ve s t e d in it ia lly. Cle a r ly fr o m t h e m a t r ix b e lo w, t h e m o s t a g g r e g a t e -p r o ﬁ t
e ﬃ c ie n t is fo r o n ly o n e ﬁ r m t o in ve s t .





















Fo r o n e o f t h o s e e ﬃ c ie n t p r o ﬁ le s ( o ﬀ-d ia g o n a l c e lls in t h e t a b le a b o ve ) t o e qu ilib r a t e ,
t h e c o llu s ive qu a n t it ie s qi a n d qu m u s t s a t is fy b o t h t h e c o llu s ive in c e n t ive s ( 2 .4 .1 ) a n d
( 2 .4 .2 ) wh ic h c a n b e r e s p e c t ive ly r e a r r a n g e d in t o







Q[P] ( 3 .2 .2 )











fo r t h e u n in ve s t e d ﬁ r m ,











ln δ. ( 3 .2 .4 )
Ou r qu a lit a t ive c o n c lu s io n s c a n b e c a t e g o r is e d in t o fo u r s u b c a s e s d e p e n d in g u p o n t h e c o s t
o f t h e in it ia l in ve s t m e n t k in it s p r o p o r t io n t o t h e c o llu s ive p r o ﬁ t s . Th e e xa c t s u b c a s e s
a r e lis t e d in t h e a p p e n d ix.
3.3 Lower discount factor - str onger time pr efer ences








, b o t h ﬁ r m s n e e d t o in ve s t in o r d e r t o s u s t a in c o llu s io n . If
t h e in it ia l in ve s t m e n t p r o ve s p r o h ib it ive ly c o s t ly, t h a t is wh e n k > −
PQ[P]
2 ln δ
, c o llu s io n
will n o t m a t e r ia lis e in e qu ilib r iu m .










u n in ve s t e d 0 0
3.4 Lowest discount factor - str ongest time pr efer ences
Fin a lly, wh e n 0 ≤ δ <
1
4
, t h e r e is n o h o p e t o s u s t a in c o llu s io n . Th e r e fo r e , n e it h e r ﬁ r m
in ve s t s .
in ve s t e d u n in ve s t e d
−k 0
in ve s t e d −k −k
−k 0
u n in ve s t e d 0 0
4 E quilibr ium investment in the common good
Ou r e qu ilib r iu m a n a lys is in t h e fo r e g o in g t wo s e c t io n s e n t a il t h e fo llo win g .
7P r oposition 1 : Th e s u b g a m e p e r fe c t e qu ilib r ia in t h e e xt e n d e d g a m e a r e s u c h t h a t :


































































[1-n] n e it h e r ﬁ r m in ve s t s , n o c o llu s io n is s u s t a in e d , if
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P r oposition 2 : On ly o n e ﬁ r m ’s in it ia l in ve s t m e n t e n a b le s t h e m o s t e ﬃ c ie n t e qu ilib r iu m
in t h e t wo ﬁ r m s ’ jo in t c o llu s ive p r o ﬁ t s wh e n , a n d o n ly wh e n
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In e a c h o f t h e s e c a s e s , o n e ﬁ r m ’s in ve s t m e n t s u ﬃ c e s t o s u s t a in t h e c o llu s ive o u t c o m e ,
h e n c e s e r ve s a s a n e ﬀe c t ive c o m m o n g o o d b e t we e n t h e t wo ﬁ r m s . In p r ic e c o llu s io n , t h e
in ve s t e d ﬁ r m c la im s a la r g e r s h a r e t h a n t h a t o f t h e u n in ve s t e d ﬁ r m , wh e r e b y t h e r e n t fo r
it s in it ia l in ve s t m e n t in t h e c o m m o n g o o d is r e c o ve r e d .
D e t a ile d p r o o fs o f t h e s e t wo p r o p o s it io n s a r e s u b s t a n t ia t e d in t h e a p p e n d ix.
5 Gener alisations
In t h is s e c t io n we b r ie ﬂ y d is c u s s h o w t h o s e ﬁ n d in g s fr o m o u r s im p le lin e a r B e r t r a n d
d u o p o ly m o d e l c o u ld b e a p p lie d t o m o r e g e n e r a l s e t t in g s .
5.1 M or e ﬁr ms
Co n s id e r t h e s a m e e xt e n d e d r e p e a t e d B e r t r a n d g a m e a s in s e c t io n s 2 t h r o u g h 4 e xc e p t
t h a t we n o w h a ve n ≥ 3 ﬁ r m s . Th e fo llo win g o b s e r va t io n s c a n b e e s t a b lis h e d wit h o u t
d e t a ile d c o m p u t a t io n s .
• If o n ly o n e ﬁ r m h a s in ve s t e d , wh e n it d e via t e s b y u n d e r c u t t in g t h e c o llu s ive p r ic e ,
it c a n s we e p t h e e n t ir e t y o f t h e m a r ke t d e m a n d fo r o n e fu ll p e r io d .
• If a t le a s t t wo ﬁ r m s h a ve in ve s t e d , wh e n o n e o f t h e m d e via t e s , a n o t h e r in ve s t e d ﬁ r m
will r e -u n d e r c u t in a h a lf p e r io d .
H e n c e , t h e r e is n o a d d e d c o llu s ive e n fo r c e a b ilit y g a in e d b y t h r e e o r m o r e ﬁ r m s in ve s t in g
in fr e qu e n t r e vis io n s o f a c t io n s .
Th is im p lie s t h a t , in r e p e a t e d B e r t r a n d o lig o p o ly g a m e s in vo lvin g t h r e e o r m o r e ﬁ r m s ,
t h e r e e xis t va s t r a n g e s o f ( r e la t ive ly in e xp e n s ive ) in it ia l in ve s t m e n t c o s t s wh e r e o n ly s o m e
( n o m o r e t h a n t wo ) n o t a ll o f t h e o lig o p o lis t s r e vis e t h e ir a c t io n s m o r e fr e qu e n t ly t h a n
o t h e r s , t o s u s t a in t a c it ly c o llu s ive s u b g a m e p e r fe c t e qu ilib r ia .
95.2 N onlinear B er tr and oligopoly
Ou r ﬁ n d in g s fr o m s e c t io n s 2 t h r o u g h 4 a r e in d e p e n d e n t o f fu n c t io n a l s p e c iﬁ c it ie s o f t h e
d e m a n d fu n c t io n in s o fa r a s u s u a l r e g u la r it y c o n d it io n s ( s u c h a s t h e e xis t e n c e o f a n in t e r io r
jo in t -r e ve n u e m a xim u m ) a r e m e t . A ls o , wh e n m a r g in a l c o s t s t r u c t u r e s in vo lve s lig h t
e c o n o m ie s o r d is e c o n o m ie s o f s c a le , o r wh e n p r o d u c t s a r e s lig h t ly b u t n o t s t r o n g ly d iﬀe r -
e n t ia t e d b e t we e n t h e ﬁ r m s , o u r fo r e g o in g ﬁ n d in g s s h a ll a p p r o xim a t e ly a p p ly, wh e r e t h e
p r e c is io n o f s u c h a p p lic a b ilit y va r ie s r e ﬂ e c t in g t h e n o n lin e a r it y o f t h e m o d iﬁ e d m o d e l.
5.3 Cour not oligopoly
In Co u r n o t , d e via t io n p r o ﬁ t s d e p e n d s p e c iﬁ c a lly o n t h e fu n c t io n a l fo r m o f t h e in ve r s e
d e m a n d . It is t h e r e fo r e le s s s t r a ig h t fo r wa r d t o qu a n t ify t h e e xa c t c o n d it io n s fo r s u b g a m e
p e r fe c t e qu ilib r iu m c o n ﬁ g u r a t io n s t h a n in B e r t r a n d . Qu a lit a t ive ly, h o we ve r , t h e fo llo win g
a n a lo g y t o t h e fo r e g o in g B e r t r a n d c a s e c a n b e c o n t e m p la t e d .
Co n s id e r ﬁ r s t t h e a s ym m e t r ic d u o p o ly, in vo lvin g o n e in ve s t e d ﬁ r m a n d o n e u n in ve s t e d
ﬁ r m . A s s u m in g t h a t t h e ﬁ r m s s p lit t h e m a r ke t e ve n ly wh e n c o llu d in g , t h e in ve s t e d ﬁ r m ’s
d e via t io n p r o ﬁ t s is t h e s a m e a s wh e n n e it h e r ﬁ r m in ve s t s , a s it s s t a t ic b e s t r e s p o n s e a ﬀo r d s
t h e ﬁ r m a m a xim u m d e via t io n p r o ﬁ t d u r in g o n e fu ll u n in t e r r u p t e d p e r io d . Th e u n in ve s t e d
ﬁ r m , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , c a n g a in le s s fr o m a u n ila t e r a l d e via t io n b e c a u s e it s o p p o n e n t c a n
in t e r c e p t t h e d e via n t a t t e m p t a ft e r h a lf a p e r io d . Th is im p lie s t h e fo llo win g , a n a lo g o u s ly
t o o u r B e r t r a n d o b s e r va t io n s .
• If t h e t wo ﬁ r m s a r e t o s h a r e t h e m a r ke t e ve n ly wh e n e ve r c o llu d in g , t h e n o n ly o n e
ﬁ r m ’s in it ia l in ve s t m e n t c o n t r ib u t e s lit t le t o c o llu s ive s u s t a in a b ilit y.
• If t h e t wo ﬁ r m s a d ju s t t h e ir c o llu s ive m a r ke t s h a r e s c o m m e n s u r a t e t o t h e ir in it ia l
in ve s t m e n t p r o ﬁ le s , t h e n o n ly o n e ﬁ r m ’s in it ia l in ve s t m e n t c a n e n h a n c e c o llu s ive
s u s t a in a b ilit y.
W it h n ≥ 3 ﬁ r m s , t h e p o s s ib le a n a lo g y t o o u r B e r t r a n d o b s e r va t io n s in 5 .1 h in g e s c r it ic a lly
u p o n a n in ve s t e d ﬁ r m ’s a b ilit y t o in ﬂ ic t a s s e ve r e a p u n is h m e n t o n a n u n in ve s t e d d e via t o r
a s m o r e t h a n o n e in ve s t e d ﬁ r m s t o g e t h e r . W h ils t s u c h a b ilit y wa s g u a r a n t e e d in t h e c a s e
o f p e r fe c t B e r t r a n d , it is n o lo n g e r g u a r a n t e e d in Co u r n o t , im p lyin g t h a t in t h e la t t e r
t h e r e g e n e r a lly r e m a in s a p r o s p e c t fo r m o r e t h a n t wo in ve s t e d ﬁ r m s t o e n h a n c e c o llu s ive
s u s t a in a b ilit y.
1 06 Conclusion and economic implications
Fir m s ’ a b ilit y t o r e vis e t h e ir a c t io n s fr e qu e n t ly m ig h t , t o a s p o n t a n e o u s m in d , s o u n d a s
if p o s it ive ly c o n t r ib u t in g t o s o c ia l we lfa r e . S u c h a n in n o c u o u s in t u it io n m a y we ll t u r n
o u t fa c t u a lly a c c u r a t e if t h e e c o n o m y, o r m o r e s p e c iﬁ c a lly t h e in d u s t r y in qu e s t io n , fa c e s
a s e r ie s o f s t o c h a s t ic s h o c ks . N o n -p r o b a b ilis t ic a lly, o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , it s h o u ld n o t b e
o ve r lo o ke d t h a t fr e qu e n t r e vis io n o f o lig o p o lis t ic ﬁ r m s ’ a c t io n s fa c ilit a t e s t a c it c o llu s io n
a n d t h e r e b y, in g e n e r a l, h in d e r s s o c ia l we lfa r e .
In t h is p a p e r we h a ve s h o wn t h a t s u c h c o llu s ive im p a c t s c a n r e s u lt fr o m o n ly s o m e ,
n o t a ll ﬁ r m s b e in g fa s t in r e vis in g t h e ir a c t io n s . E s p e c ia lly in a n e n vir o n m e n t wh e r e
c o llu s ive e xc e s s p r o ﬁ t s a r e o ve r wh e lm in g ly h ig h e r t h a n n o n -c o llu s ive n o r m a l p r o ﬁ t s , s u c h
a s r e p e a t e d p e r fe c t B e r t r a n d o lig o p o ly, a s m a ll m in o r it y a m o n g t h e o lig o p o lis t s b e in g
a b le t o r e vis e t h e ir a c t io n s m u c h fa s t e r t h a n t h e r e m a in d e r o f t h e m , m a y s u b s t a n t ia lly
c o n t r ib u t e t o t h e s u s t a in a b ilit y o f t a c it c o llu s io n in t h e e n t ir e t y o f t h e o lig o p o lis t ic in d u s t r y.
P r e s u m a b ly, a ﬁ r m ’s c a p a c it y t o r e vis e it s a c t io n wit h a n e n h a n c e d fr e qu e n c y is a fr u it
o f c o s t ly o r g a n is a t io n a l e ﬀo r t s . Th e r e wa r d fo r s u c h e ﬀo r t s is t h e e n h a n c e d s u s t a in a b ilit y
o f c o llu s io n a n d t h e lio n ’s s h a r e wh ic h t h e ﬁ r m c a n c la im in c o llu s ive s a le s in r e la t io n t o
o t h e r c o llu d in g o lig o p o lis t s wh o h a ve m a d e le s s o f s u c h e ﬀo r t s . Th is c a n b e vie we d a s if
t h e ﬁ r m is s e r vin g a s a c o llu s ive wa t c h d o g d e le g a t e d b y t h e r e m a in d e r o f t h e in d u s t r y fo r
a “ fe e ” o r a “ r e n t ” in t h e fo r m o f a n e xt r a e n t it le m e n t in t h e m a r ke t s h a r e .
Th is s c e n a r io in d ic a t e s t h a t a n in d u s t r y c o n s is t in g o f a fe w “ p r o g r e s s ive ” ﬁ r m s wh o
a r e qu ic k in r e vis in g t h e ir a c t io n s a n d a la r g e m a jo r it y o f “ c o n s e r va t ive ” ﬁ r m s wh o a r e
s lo w in d e c is io n m a kin g , wh e r e t h e fo r m e r ﬁ r m s a r e p r o ﬁ t in g c o n s id e r a b ly m o r e t h a n t h e
la t t e r , m a ke s a p o t e n t ia l a n t it r u s t s u s p e c t .
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, e qu ilib r iu m c o n d it io n s fo r o n ly o n e ﬁ r m ’s
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W h e n k is s u ﬃ c ie n t ly lo w, ( 2 .4 .4 ) vio la t e s ( 3 .2 .4 ) . Th e r e fo r e t h e lo we s t a d m is s ib le
d is c o u n t fa c t o r δ t o s u s t a in t a c it c o llu s io n wit h o n ly o n e ﬁ r m in ve s t in g in it ia lly, is
1 1d e t e r m in e d b y t h e t wo b in d in g c o n s t r a in t s ( 3 .2 .1 ) a n d ( 3 .2 .4 ) . If δ is b e lo w t h is
lo we r b o u n d ( b u t
1
4
o r a b o ve ) , b o t h ﬁ r m s in ve s t t o s u s t a in c o llu s io n .
Th e r a n g e o f δ a n d qi , qu s a t is fyin g ( 3 .2 .1 ) a n d ( 3 .2 .2 ) is s u r r o u n d e d b y t h e t h ic ke n e d
lo c i in t h e d ia g r a m m e . In a d d it io n , ( 3 .2 .3 ) a n d ( 3 .2 .4 ) s t ip u la t e t h a t t h e c o llu s ive
qu a n t it ie s qi , qu lie b e t we e n t h e t wo p a r a lle l d o wn s lo p in g c u r ve s . Th e s lo p e o f t h e s e
c u r ve s va r y d e p e n d in g u p o n k , wh e r e b y t h e m in im u m a d m is s ib le δ c o n s is t e n t wit h
t h e s e c o n d it io n s a ls o va r y a s in d ic a t e d b y t h e t h ic ke n e d d o t s in t h e d ia g r a m m e .
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W h e n k is m o d e r a t e , ( 2 .4 .4 ) c o m p lie s wit h b o t h ( 3 .2 .3 ) a n d ( 3 .2 .4 ) . Th e lo we s t





a s in ( 2 .4 .4 ) .
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W h e n k is h ig h e r , ( 2 .4 .4 ) vio la t e s ( 3 .2 .3 ) . Th e lo we s t d is c o u n t fa c t o r δ a d m it t in g
1 2p r ic e c o llu s io n b e t we e n o n e in ve s t e d ﬁ r m a n d o n e u n in ve s t e d ﬁ r m , is t h e r e fo r e d e t e r -
m in e d b y t h e t wo b in d in g c o n s t r a in t s ( 3 .2 .2 ) a n d ( 3 .2 .3 ) . If δ is b e lo w t h is lo we r
b o u n d , n e it h e r ﬁ r m s in ve s t s , a n d c o llu s io n is n o lo n g e r s u s t a in a b le .
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W h e n k is p r o h ib it ive ly h ig h , t h e a fo r e m e n t io n e d lo we s t d is c o u n t fa c t o r s u s t a in in g
c o llu s io n b e t we e n a n in ve s t e d a n d a n u n in ve s t e d ﬁ r m s d e t e r m in e d b y ( 3 .2 .2 ) a n d
( 3 .2 .3 ) b e c o m e s h ig h e r t h a n
1
2
, t h e r a n g e wh e r e n o in it ia l in ve s t m e n t c a n b e n e t t
p r o ﬁ t e ﬃ c ie n t . Co llu s io n is t h e r e b y u n s u s t a in a b le .
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